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The belief that efficiency and equity can somehow be separated represents one of the oldest 
dreams in economics ........       Mark Blaug*
 
The currently established welfare criterion used in international trade theory results in conclusions 
that are not only intellectually dishonest and deceptively misleading but are not as value free as is commonly 
believed. Although academic economists have devoted much effort to understanding the distributional effects 
of trade, the current welfare conclusions of trade basically ignore entirely the distributional effects.  This paper 
argues that trade policy needs to be framed within a legitimate moral framework that moves distribution to the 
forefront. The welfare effects of trade should be judged by what actually happens, not by what could 
potentially happen in an idealized world with costless transfers.  
 
In the first section the inadequacy of current international welfare economics is discussed. Second, the 
justification for using a utilitarian framework is developed along with a brief history of the doctrine and its role 
in Cambridge welfare economics. Next the properties of a utility function that would be realistic as well as 
having desirable mathematical properties are discussed. Welfare considerations would not be especially 
important if trade did not create significant redistributions; therefore the size of the redistributions relative to 
the efficiency gains from trade liberalization is examined. Finally, the welfare effects of trade liberalization 
using various trade models and simulations are discussed.  
 
The Inadequacy of Modern International Welfare Economics  
 
The current approach to the welfare analysis of trade is to follow the recommendation of Hicks and 
Kaldor and equate national welfare with real national income and ignore entirely how income is distributed. 
Although admitting that considering distribution involves an unscientific value judgment, numerous 
economists (such as I.M.D. Little, Frank Knight, Edward Chamberlin) have concluded that distribution is 
too important to ignore and it is better to consider it even if that makes the analysis less than scientific. As 
Blaug has stated (1978,p. 626), “the true function of welfare economics is to invade the discipline of applied 
ethics rather than to avoid it.”   
 
The basic objective of trade policy under modern welfare analysis therefore is to maximize national 
income. This outcome is considered optimal because of the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle whereby 
everyone could potentially be made better off than in any other alternative with the appropriate lump sum 
transfers. For some, the possibility that these transfers could be made is sufficient, regardless of whether any 
transfers are actually made. For others, there is a naive belief that after all the income maximizing policies 
are implemented, that the government (or society) then consistently redistributes income in a manner 
consistent with its specific social welfare function. However, Rodrik (1997, p.30) is correct when he states 
that in regard to trade policy changes, “compensation rarely takes place in practice and never in full.”  Even 
if society wanted to redistribute income, however, it can not be done in a zero costs lump sum fashion. The 
                                                 
* Robert C. Shelburne (Robert.shelburne@unece.org), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The views are those of 
the author and do not represent the official positions of the UN Economic Commission for Europe or its member states. This paper 
was originally presented at the ASSA in Washington, DC in January, 2003 and published in the Papers and Proceedings of the 
International Trade and Finance Association. The author thanks H. Peter Gray and Giovanni Facchini for helpful comments.  
  2 
                                                
compensation approach is intellectually dishonest in that it incorporates the inefficiencies (and 
welfare losses) associated with trade but assumes that any redistribution can be made lump-sum 
without a welfare loss.
2 This would be equivalent to the case of someone wishing to show how trade 
lowered social welfare by calculating the welfare loss that would result from the disincentives of 
having to redistribute income through the income tax system but who totally ignored the welfare 
gain from reducing tariffs. This approach is deceptive in that it proposes a political adjustment 
mechanism that simply does not exist in the current political system (at least not in the United 
States). The political system is such that how income is originally distributed limits the degree to 
which a redistribution can actually be made. For these reasons then, income gains are not 
redistributed.  Many including Arrow (1950, p.330) have concluded that “the compensation principle 
must be regarded as [an] unsatisfactory technique[s] for the determination of social preferences.”  
Woodland (1982, p. 265) concludes, “If compensation is not paid, then it is difficult to argue in 
favour of free trade, unless one is prepared to base the argument upon a demonstration that the 
nation has a social welfare function which is actually increased in value.”  In addition, this technical 
economic interpretation of what constitutes a welfare gain is not the same as the general public’s 
interpretation of the meaning of this term; this difference has been used by liberalization advocates 
to their great advantage.    
 
Is it possible to increase actual (as opposed to potential) social welfare by redistributing the 
gains from trade?  There have been a number of recent papers that have demonstrated why it may 
not be possible to redistribute the gains from trade. In the simple hypothetical case, the government 
is able to simply take the income from the winners and give it to the losers. However in the real 
world, the government does not know precisely who the winners are, and the tax structure does not 
allow specific groups to be targeted. For example, if the only tax is a progressive income tax, a lot of 
the income redistributed may have nothing to do with trade, and it’s possible that some money could 
be redistributed from the losers to the winners. Spector (2001) has demonstrated that if a country 
redistributes income using a non-linear income tax to maximize a social welfare function, that with 
free trade the country may end up with a lower level of social welfare relative to autarky. Within this 
model, social welfare is maximized with a combination of redistribution and tariffs. Thus the 
redistribution that is at the core of the basic proposition favoring free trade may not be possible, as a 
practical manner, with only income taxes.  
 
The ability to redistribute through the tax system is further reduced by the administrative 
costs of redistributing and the disincentives created not only for those being taxed but for those 
receiving income, i.e. the “leaky bucket” losses of transferring income.  Furthermore, there exist a 
number of practical complications concerning redistribution so as to make the necessary 
redistributions unlikely to occur in practice.   Just as the need to redistribute through the tax system 
has increased, the ability to do so has decreased. Rodrik (1997) has emphasized how the 
international mobility of capital has shifted taxes onto labor and made redistribution more difficult. 
This trend has accelerated in last few years as the average company tax rates in the OECD have 
 
2 However, Dixit and Norman (1980) have demonstrated that there is a set of domestic taxes 
on commodities and factors with free trade that is Pareto superior (nobody loses) to no trade.   
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declined consistently from 37.6 percent in 1996 to 30.8 percent in 2003 (ILO, p. 40, 2004). The 
failure to redistribute the gains from openness has also been compounded by the perverse nature of 
the U.S. political system where increased income translates into increased political power. As a 
result, the increases in inequality have not been corrected with increases in redistribution, but have 
been further magnified with political gifts of tax cuts and regulatory reform that have primarily 
benefited corporations and the rich. The elections of 2002 provide evidence of how money now 
controls the political process; more than 95 percent of the races for the U.S. Congress were won by 
the candidate who spent the largest amount (Makinson, 2002). The tax cuts since 1981 have favored 
the very rich while most of the tax increases have fallen primarily on the working class.  Inequality 
creates greater inequality through a vicious political cycle. Krugman (2002) commenting on the 
political dimension of the increasing inequality writes: 
 
... economic policy has reinforced, not countered the movement toward greater inequality. 
Money buys political influence...it also buys intellectual influence...growing income 
disparities in the United States, far from leading to demands to soak the rich, have been 
accompanied by a growing movement to let them keep more of their earnings. This 
obviously raises the possibility of a self-reinforcing process. 
 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) document this process in the historical development of Latin 
America; there initial inequality in Latin America resulted in the development of institutions which 
further perpetuated the advantages of the elite classes.  Rodrik’s (1997) argument that trade 
openness is correlated with the size of the welfare state might be taken as evidence that the gains 
from trade are routinely redistributed. However, the time series evidence is totally inconsistent with 
this thesis; as openness has increased throughout the OECD countries over the last several decades, 
the welfare state has been under assault.  
      
Besides the mechanism where those getting richer obtain more political power and are thus 
able to reduce redistributions, trade liberalization also makes countries more cognizant of 
competitive conditions and they try to maintain competitiveness by instituting policies to lower labor 
costs and reduce the taxation of capital. For example in the 1990s in the debates about raising the 
minimum wage, Newt Gingrich expressed the concern that with the recently passed NAFTA, the 
U.S. could not raise the minimum wage if it wanted to stay competitive with Mexico. In a similar 
vein, Dorman (2002) has argued that the reduction in social spending by Canada from 45 percent of 
GDP in 1992 to 35 percent in 1999 and the lowered corporate tax rates were motivated by the 
Canadian government’s desire to remain competitive after the formation of the free trade area with 
the United States.  
 
Here it is argued that the compensation principle where compensation does not actually occur 
lacks any legitimacy. The argument that it is not important how a given level of income is 
distributed is just as much of a normative value judgment as the argument for a specific distribution. 
The belief that the government redistributes income in a lump sum fashion after the fact to achieve 
some independent social objective is not only not consistent with actual political reality but is not 
even practically possible. The concern here is not with redistribution, per se; but with the effects of 
redistribution between groups with different income levels. Some, such as Corden (1974) have  
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argued that there is something special about the initial distribution of income, and any movement 
from it represents a welfare loss since it is only fair to compensate those harmed by an exogenous 
policy decision. In this paper the initial and final income distributions are evaluated using a common 
social welfare function; the initial distribution is not viewed in any way as preferable just because it 
is the initial distribution.   
 
Therefore it is proposed that the only way to evaluate the welfare effects of trade 
liberalization is to specify a social welfare function and examine the actual effects of trade 
liberalization. The spirit of this paper is similar to that of Fair (1971) in the sense of proposing and 
quantifying a social welfare function. In order to do this the concepts of cardinal utility, the law of 
diminishing marginal utility of income, and interpersonal utility comparisons are resurrected. 
Although these assumptions are often referred to as value judgments, these are not normative value 
judgments but are subjective assessments about the true nature of reality. The weighting that each 
person’s utility will receive is assessing the social welfare is a normative value judgment, but the 
belief that individuals’ utility functions are similar is not. As such, these assumptions are no 
different than many other assumptions currently made widely in economics which are beyond 
empirical verification such as rational expectations or infinite horizons. From this author’s 
perspective the assumptions concerning cardinal utility functions subject to diminishing marginal 
utility are more realistic than many of assumptions commonly being made in contemporary 
economics. Since the objective is to revive the utilitarian welfare economics associated with the 
Cambridge School, we begin with a brief review of that philosophical tradition. 
 
A Brief History of Utilitarianism and Cambridge Welfare Economics 
 
Utilitarianism is generally viewed as the dominant political philosophy or ethical theory over 
the last century, if not the last two (Brown, 1986; or Sen, 1999). In the words of Welch (1987, 
p.775), utilitarianism “dominates the landscape of contemporary thought in the social sciences.”  
That is not to say that there have not been a large number of strong critics, including John Rawls, 
Amartya Sen, Karl Marx, and Robert Nozick; however, none of these alternatives has garnered more 
than a small percentage of opinion.  Almost all of these competing philosophers (Welch, 1987,p.775) 
“share a preoccupation with disposing of the claims of utilitarianism as a necessary preclude to 
developing their own positions.” As such, utilitarianism is the moral philosophy by which all others 
are compared. It appears that little has changed since John Stuart Mill (1863, p.3) summed up the 
situation in his day, “after more than two thousand years the same discussions continue, 
philosophers are still ranged under the same contending banners, and neither thinkers nor mankind at 
large seem nearer to being unanimous on the subject.”  Utilitarianism can be interpreted as providing 
principles for a personal moral code as well as for conceptions of social justice. It is the latter issue 
of interest here: that being, what principles define a just society, with the emphasis on the question 
of distributive justice. 
 
Although the spirit of utilitarianism has been present in ethical theory since ancient times, 
Sidgwick (1902) concluded that utilitarian doctrine was first formally advanced by Shaftesbury in 
1711. Hutcheson  (1720) was the first to explicitly state what would become the philosophy’s central 
principle – “that action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers.” The  
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philosophy developed on the premise that the divine rights and “self-evident” natural rights 
philosophies had (Welch, 1987, p. 775), “been discredited beyond rehabilitation as criterions of 
moral choice.”
3 In England, initially, utilitarianism followed a theological channel, while in France 
it was developed into a reform oriented practical political philosophy by the Encyclopedists (and tax 
collector) Claude A. Helvetius’s in De l’esprit (Essays on the Mind) in 1758. Since it attacked 
morality based upon religion, Helvetius’s book was promptly condemned by the Pope, the Paris 
Parliament, and the Sorbonne and burnt au centre ville; Helvetius was ordered to recant his views 
and he complied in order to save his position, if not his life. Francois Quesnay, of the physiocrats, 
incorporated aspects of the philosophy into their movement with the publication of Tableau 
economique which was also published in 1758 (Sabine, 1961).  
 
It was from this French strain that Jeremy Bentham and James Mill created the intellectual 
structure of the English political movement referred to as the Philosophical Radicals.
4 The 
terminology “utilitarianism” first appeared in Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation in 1781 (but not published until 1789). Bentham’s student and James Mill’s son, 
John Stuart Mill further formalized its principles and integrated them into economic thought. The 
philosophy has been intertwined with welfare economics ever since. Many of the most prominent 
economists of the 19
th century and the early 20
th century were advocates; this group included 
Hermann Gossen, John Marshall,  Francis Y. Edgeworth, William Stanley Jevons, Henry Sidgwick, 
J.B. Say, Dennis Robertson, and Arthur C. Pigou. Utilitarian welfare principles provided the basis of 
what Bergson (1938) would refer to as the Cambridge School’s welfare economics. In order to apply 
utilitarian principles to economic welfare analysis, it was necessary to both measure utility by some 
cardinal means and to make interpersonal comparisons between individuals.       
 
A number of those prominent in the early development of utility theory, such as Menger and 
Walras, saw no problem with interpersonal utility comparisons (Blaug, 1978).  Others  accepted that 
this was not scientifically possible, but attempting to do so through intuition was nevertheless 
justified on the grounds of expediency and pragmatism. The shortcomings of this approach were 
acceptable because it was believed that there simply were no other legitimate alternatives for 
evaluating social welfare. Bentham states this explicitly (from Halevy, 1901, p. 481):  
 
This addibility of the happiness of different subjects, however, when considered rigorously it 
may appear fictitious, is a postulatum without the allowance of which all political reasoning 
is at a stand.  
 
 
3However, Sabine (1961) argues that few writers of the eighteenth century, except Hume 
who had led the attack on natural rights, fully appreciated the fact that utilitarianism essentially 
invalidated Locke’s natural rights. 
4 Ricardo was also a member of this group (Canterbery, 2001); although Ricardo accepted 
the philosophical objective of utilitarianism (greatest good, etc.) he was critical of the subjective 
aspects as developed by Bentham (Canterbery, oral communication).   
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Since utility is not directly observable, if the philosophy is to be used for the evaluation of 
economic and social policies, it is necessary to specify the factors on which it depends. Although it 
does not follow logically from the philosophy of utilitarianism, most utilitarianists from Bentham, 
Mill, and through the Cambridge Welfare School, also believed in the diminishing marginal utility 
of income.   In fact, they believed in this principle to such a degree that it was referred to as the law 
of diminishing marginal utility of income.
5 Although this was a explicit belief of the utilitarianists, it 
was implicitly a belief of most of the early economists credited with developing utility theory. For 
example, all three of the economists who are generally credited with integrating utility analysis 
firmly into neoclassical economics – Walras, Menger, and Jevons (as well as Pareto and Marshall)– 
all considered an individual’s total utility to be an additive function of the utilities from consuming 
each good such that UN=U(C1) + U(C2) + ... U(CN) where CN is the quantity of good N. Since each 
product was assumed to be subject to diminishing marginal utility (∂
2 U/∂CN 
2< 0), the marginal 
utility of income must also decrease as income increases. According to Stigler (1950), this 
implication of the additive function may not have been widely appreciated by many of these 
economists.    
 
Combining utilitarianism with the diminishing marginal utility of income suggested that a 
rather egalitarian distribution of income would maximize social welfare. However, it should be 
noted that Bentham and his contemporaries, although egalitarian in terms of political rights were less 
so in terms of distributive justice (although Bentham broke with tradition and advocated that each 
child get an equal division of inheritance); Russell (1945) concluded that in the 19
th century conflict 
between capital and labor (p.724), “the Benthamites, broadly speaking, sided with the employers 
against the working class.” Bentham was cognizant of the likelihood that equality might reduce the 
size of the pie; in addition, his enthusiasm for too much equality, liberty and fraternity was tempered 
by the chaos that had engulfed France after the revolution. It was John Stuart Mill as he grew older 
who shifted the focus to improving the working conditions for labor and the poor; he even went so 
far as to advocate confiscatory (100 per cent) inheritance taxes (Scitovsky, 1964). By the end of the 
century, the idea that a redistribution of income towards equality would increase social welfare was 
found in most of the economic texts of the time (such as Pigou). According to Blaug (1978, p.318):    
 
  Most writers after 1870 were extremely critical of the existing inequalities in income 
distribution and did not hesitate to use utility theory to fortify their critical outlook. 
 
Little (2002, p.54) concludes that historically “utilitarianism was the main intellectual force driving 
most equalizing social reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” However, concerns about 
the detrimental effects that too much equality might have on economic growth and liberty were also 
widely recognized (Edgeworth, 1897). 
 
Pareto  raised objections to this line of inquiry, most specifically the ability to measure and 
compare utility, and proposed that economics should be “value-free” and based on a more scientific 
                                                 
5 The proposition that there is a diminishing marginal utility of income was first formally 
advanced by Bernoulli in 1738.  
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footing.
6 This view was later adopted by Robbins and came to dominate the economics profession in 
the second half of the 20
th century; however, the Cambridge School was never really converted.  
Pigou, although accepting Pareto’s critique at the highest scientific level, nevertheless viewed it as 
irrelevant for the practical application of economic welfare analysis. Pigou concludes (1951, p.292): 
  
 
If we take random groups of people ... we find that in many features that are 
comparable by objective tests they are on average pretty much alike. On this basis we are 
entitled, I submit, to infer by analogy that they are probably pretty much alike in other 
respects also. In all practical affairs we act on that supposition. We cannot prove that it is 
true.  But we do not need to do so.  Nobody can prove that anybody besides himself exists, 
but nevertheless, everybody is quite sure of it.  We do not, in short, and there is no reason 
why we should, start from a tabula rasa, binding ourselves to hold every opinion which the 
natural man entertains to be guilty until it is proved innocent.  The burden is the other way. 
To deny this is to wreck, not only Welfare Economics, but the whole apparatus of practical 
thought. On the basis of analogy, observation and intercourse, interpersonal comparisons 
can, as I think, properly be made.   
 
This assessment was typical of the Cambridge economists of the time, according to Scitovsky 
(1951, p. 303) they “duly noted these difficulties and promptly dismissed them as unimportant.” 
They continued to accept the law of diminishing marginal utility and assume that individuals had 
equal propensities for enjoyment (which allowed interpersonal comparisons). This was also the 
assessment of Keynes who, although not a utilitarianist, took issue with Robbins and argued that 
economics was a moral science that justifiably employed introspection to analyze the intentions, 
motivations, and reactions of economic agents (Bateman and Davis, 1991). 
 
This issue as to whether the capacity of individuals for enjoyment is similar in all was central 
in the debate about interpersonal utility comparisons. For those wishing to salvage the old welfare 
economics, it was argued that although individuals might vary, random groups of individuals would 
not, and since there was no reason to believe that income would be correlated with this ability for 
enjoyment, it was appropriate to assume equality of capacity for enjoyment (Melville, 1939). 
Similarly, Keynes argued that although introspection may not allow one to know the thoughts and 
feelings of a particular individual, it was reasonably possible to understand average behavior 
(Bateman and Davis, 1991). In addition, Lerner (p.355 in Blaug, 1978) showed that even if some 
were more able to get enjoyment from a given level of income than others (i.e., had higher marginal 
utilities), as long as it is unknown who these people are, any movement away from equalitarianism 
lowered the expected value of overall utility. Although these refinements did not make interpersonal 
comparisons more scientific, it did provide some support for making this an “acceptable” value 
judgment.  Arrow (1973, p.252) has observed that “the problem of interpersonal comparisons of 
utilities seems to bother economists more than philosophers.” 
 
6 Of course, as argued by Sen (1982), the Pareto criteria is not value-free but is based on a 
value judgment that is just more universally accepted.  
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It should be noted that even Lionel Robbins who strongly questioned the scientific validity of 
making interpersonal utility comparisons did not question the desirability of doing so. Robbins 
stated (1938, p.641):  
 
... its justification is more ethical than scientific. But we all agree that it is fitting that 
such assumptions should be made and their implication explored with the aid of the 
economist’s technique.  Our dispute relates to definitions and to logical status, not to our 
obligations as human beings.  
 
The introduction of the social welfare function (SWF) by Bergson and Samuelson allowed 
ethics to be integrated into welfare economics in a more transparent manner. The social welfare 
function explicitly defined the  social welfare as a function of the utilities of the individual members 
of the society. Thus the social welfare function could be expressed mathematically as W = f ( U1  
..UN) where W is social welfare and UN is the welfare of the N
th individual. The mathematical form 
of the function was dictated by the ethical standard. Bergson (1938) appears to have been the first to 
mathematically specify the Cambridge School’s utilitarian objective as W = Σ UN ; this mathematical 
form has sometimes been labeled as the Benthamite SWF.
7  This has generally been accepted as the 
utilitarian objective, although it still might be possible for a utilitarian to object to this formulation 
by arguing that social welfare is more than simply a function of the individuals’ welfares of the 
population. However, according to Bentham, “ The interest of the community is -- what? The sum of 
the interests of the several members who compose it.” 
 
Harsanyi (1953; and 1955) used Neuman-Morgenstern decision theory under uncertainty to 
propose the “veil of ignorance” concept of justice whereby justice could be defined as the social 
state a person would pick if he knew that he would be a member of a given society but was not 
aware of which specific individual he would be.
8 Presumably, under these conditions a person would 
be impartial and therefore his decisions would be fair. Under this veil of ignorance Harsanyi 
proposed that an individual would use the Neuman-Morgenstern decision rule of maximizing 
expected utility. He demonstrated that an individual who wished to maximize his expected utility 
would choose the social state where the objective was to maximize the sum of utilities of the 
individuals. Thus Harsanyi demonstrated that utilitarianism was a philosophy that a rational 
individual would choose if he accepted the higher ethical principle of the veil of ignorance. Lerner 
(1944) had previously demonstrated that an equal distribution of income maximizes the expected 
utility of a person who is uncertain of his future position. 
 
7 There have been numerous discussions through the years as to whether the utilitarian 
objective should be to maximize W or W/n; in this analysis the number of members (n) is considered 
exogenous and thus the two objectives will be considered equivalent. The question of whether future 
generations utilities should be discounted is also ignored.  
8 The actual terminology comes from Rawls (1971); previously writers such as Harsanyi used 
the similar concept of the original position. Rawls credits the origin of the concept to Kant’s 
categorical imperative. There is also a vague correspondence with the biblical golden rule.  
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Yew-Kwang Ng (1975) demonstrated that the only type of social welfare function consistent 
with certain “reasonable” assumptions had to be of the additive form, i.e., W= Σ Ui / ai. This 
outcome results from acceptance of an individualistic social welfare function, i.e., W=f (Ui,  ..,UN) 
and the Weak Majority Preference Criterion which requires that if at least half of the population 
prefers state x to y, and no one prefers y to x, then x can be considered superior to y. This additive 
mathematical form results in making the convex egalitarian social welfare function unacceptable.  
With additional assumptions similar to the postulates for the expected utility hypothesis applied to 
social choice, the social welfare function can be further restricted to the form W=GΣ Ui + H where 
G and H are constants. Thus Ng provides further justification for an utilitarianist social welfare 
function.  
 
The new field of evolutionary psychology suggests that mankind’s moral sense is to some 
degree genetically ingrained (Wilson, 1993); within this framework there is a possible biological 
root for a utilitarian belief.
9  If utility represents different levels of biological fitness,
10 then under 
conditions of uncertainty as to what shocks an individual might expect to experience, a utilitarian 
rule for social decisions would maximize not only one’s expected utility but one’s expected 
biological fitness. Therefore a preference for a group  or coalition of individuals to be governed by a 
utilitarian standard might have a biological basis since those belonging to groups that adopted that 
standard would have had a higher probability of surviving.
11 Of course, explaining that there might 
be a biological basis for a utilitarian belief does not in any way provide it with moral legitimacy, but 
may only explain the widespread appeal of the doctrine.   
 
Finally, to conclude the discussion of moral philosophy, the field of moral psychology has 
attempted to investigate what determines one’s moral choices. For example, a number of researchers 
(Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; and Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001) have found that when there 
is an efficiency (higher joint payoff) equity tradeoff, men are significantly more likely to favor the 
former. Another finding is that often the same person makes a  different choice for what would 
appear to be essentially the same moral dilemma. It has been determined, using brain imaging 
technology, that the different result occurs because the different situations are analyzed in different 
sections of the brain depending on the level of emotional response induced by the specifics of the 
situations proposed (Greene, et al, 2001).  
 
9 As an  interesting side note, Charles Darwin (1871), the father of evolutionary psychology, 
who had argued that mankind’s moral sentiments had a biological basis was also a utilitarianist; 
however he never made the connection between these two strands of thought (Wright, 1994).  
10 This concept and some addition possible outcomes are discussed in Waldman (1994), and 
Hansson and Stuart (1990). 
11There is an element of group selection in this argument if considering a group-wide 
decision criteria, but selection could occur at the level of the individual if small voluntary coalitions 
of individuals had a decision criteria.   
  10 
                                                
  
Modern welfare analysis of trade has proceeded down a long and winding road to nowhere 
since Robbins’ critique. Although a number of other avenues have been suggested, there is no 
accepted approach for deriving social welfare from individual welfares without incorporating 
cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons. Arrow demonstrated (1950) that voting could not be 
used to derive the social welfare from the individual’s ordinal rankings of welfares.  Even the 
objectivity of this line of thought was questioned by Hildreth (1953) who argued that although 
Arrow’s objective was to rank social states without interpersonal comparison’s of utility, that in fact 
accepting the legitimacy of majority voting implicitly created a mechanism that essentially made 
interpersonal comparisons of utilities. Thus Hildreth concluded that if there is to be welfare 
economics, the issue is not whether it is necessary to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, but 
rather what sorts of interpersonal comparisons we are willing to make. Kemp and Ng (1976) and 
Parks (1976) demonstrated that in order to rank social welfare states using a SWF it was necessary to 
not only have interpersonal comparisons, but also that individual utility functions must be cardinal.
12 
Thus Welch (1987) has concluded that “far from resolving these problems, the [modern] economic 
theory of social choice has merely transposed them into different terms.” Chipman and Moore (1978, 
p.581) conclude, “When all is said and done, the New Welfare Economics has succeeded in 
replacing the utilitarian smoke-screen by a still thicker and more terrifying smoke-screen of its 
own.”  It is therefore apparent as argued by Landreth and Colander (1989, p.335) “that economists 
will either have to abandon the study of welfare economics or join other disciplines in a search for a 
theory of social welfare that explicitly recognizes the necessity of normative judgments.”      
  
In conclusion the ethical principle of utilitarianism, although widely criticized and rejected 
by many, remains the ethical belief system by which all others are judged. In the analysis to follow, 
social welfare will be defined using a more generalized form so that it remains relevant for those of 
other philosophical persuasions. However, the emphasis will be on the utilitarian implications given 
the dominance of the philosophy and the important role it has played historically in economic 
welfare analysis. 
 
Quantifying the Utility Function  
 
In order to apply utilitarian welfare analysis to issues concerning income distribution, the 
Cambridge tradition was to assume a utility function which was dependent on income and subject to 
the law of diminishing marginal utility. The law of diminishing marginal utility of income assumes 
that utility increases with income (I) at a decreasing rate, i.e., for the N
th individual, UN = f (IN) 
where  ∂UN / ∂IN >0 and ∂
2UN / ∂IN 
2 < 0. Debates as to whether this utility function was cardinal or 
ordinal dominated the first half of the 20
th century. As discussed, the SWF can only be usefully used 
to rank social welfare if utility is assumed to be cardinal.  
 
 
12 Ordinal utility functions are sufficient to derive the conditions for Pareto optimality; 
however, the choice between Pareto optimals requires the assumption of individual cardinal utility 
functions (Mueller, 2003).  
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Cardinal utility was resurrected, with the work of J. von Neuman and Oscar Morgenstern
13 
who resurrected the early 18
th century work of Daniel Bernoulli and Gabriel Cramer (of matrix 
algebra fame), on how individuals make decisions under uncertainty.  Many of the old welfare 
school, including Roy Harrod and Dennis Robertson, remained strong “cardinalists” to the end; 
Robertson  was a member of  the Cardinal Club for which he even offered to design a club tie 
(Clark, 1973). Nobel prize winner Frisch (1964) continued to argue for cardinal utility, stating (p. 
418), “The idea that cardinal utility should be avoided in economic theory is completely sterile.”   
 
Even assuming cardinal utility, the empirical acceptability of the principle of diminishing 
marginal utility of income was questioned by the observation that some people were willing to 
gamble. An individual wishing to maximize his expected utility would not accept a fair bet (i.e., he 
would be risk averse) if his utility function had the property of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income. It was also observed that many of these same gamblers also took out insurance. Numerous 
papers, including those of Friedman and Savage (1948) and Markowitz (1952) have suggested that 
there are various inflection points in the utility function; however, it has generally been assumed that 
the overall shape of the utility function was generally subject to diminishing marginal utility of 
income, although smaller segments might be convex. If the inflection point is dependent on current 
income, it does raise the possibility that there is not a universal stable utility function.   
 
Given an utilitarian SWF it is possible to derive some conclusions such as the desirability of 
an egalitarian income distribution from the generalized utility function when total income is fixed; 
however, in order to rank situations of less than perfect equality, or situations where the distribution 
alters total income, it is necessary to specify a specific functional form for the utility function in 
order to derive welfare conclusions. Although there has been considerable effort devoted to 
discussion of the utility function in the abstract, it is surprising that in the long tradition of 
Cambridge welfare analysis that this issue of functional form did not receive any substantive 
treatment. Thus not only is there no “utilitarian consensus” but there was no real discussion of the 
issue at all. The only hint of what properties a functional form should have is to found in Bentham, 
who stated (1834, III, p.229), “It will even be a matter of doubt whether ten thousand times the 
wealth will in general bring with it twice the happiness.” Thus a Bentham utility function would 
appear to require that the utility level of a very rich person should be no more than twice that of a 
poor individual.  
 
Bernoulli (Blaug, 1978), who was the first to explicitly propose a diminishing marginal 
utility of income in the early 18
th century, hypothesized that total utility is a function of the log of 
income. This functional form has the property that the marginal utility of income is ∂U/ ∂I = 1/I.  
Also, each time a person’s income is doubled, his utility goes up the same amount and his marginal 
utility falls by one-half; thus the gain in utility going from $10,000 to $20,000 is the same as going 
from $20,000 to $40,000.  The log function also would appear to be generally consistent with the 
belief of Bentham since an income of 10,000 times greater than a subsistence level (assumed to be 
$10,000) is required for total utility to double. Stiglitz (2000, p. 116) concludes that, “most 
 
13 More specifically, utility could be measured up to a linear transformation.  
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economists argue that a doubling of income will lower the marginal utility of income by a factor of 
between 2 and 4.”  Therefore Stiglitz’s general assessment would be consistent with the log function. 
The classic linear logarithmic utility function where: ln (U) = Σβi ln(qi) and qi is the quantity of each 
good i ( βi is a constant) also has the same fundamental relationship between income and marginal 
utility as the basic log function, i.e., when income goes up by x, marginal utility falls to 1/x 
(assuming the same commodity bundle).  The log function is also consistent with the Weber-Fechner 
Law from psychological studies where: Sensation= k log(Stimulus). 
 
Frisch (1964) argued that consumption studies could be used to measure the rate at which 
marginal utility declines with income (his flexibility coefficient) although the level of marginal 
utility could not be empirically determined. Clark (1973) attempted to calculate this rate of decline 
and came up with estimates that a doubling of income would reduce the marginal utility of income 
by one-half and a quadrupling of income would reduce it to a fourth. This is generally consistent 
with a log function. 
 
Some may consider that the degree that the marginal utility decreases (as income increases) 
in the log function is excessive, so a more general function may be desirable. A utility function of 
income to an exponential power provides a useful class of functions, where if U=I
β, the MU=βI
β-1. 
For the marginal utility of money to fall, β< 1. As the value of β is decreased the marginal utility of 
money falls more rapidly. In Table 1 below the marginal utility of income for multiples of any given 
level of income I is provided for values of β equal to .75, .5, .25, and .1. Also included is the log 
function for comparison. Thus for example, assuming the square root utility function (β=.5), 
someone making four times the income of someone else derives only one half of the marginal utility 
of the poorer person from the last dollar of income.
14 Note that as β→0, the function approaches the 
log function, since when using the exponent function, the ratio of marginal utilities of an individual 
with an income of x times another is x
β-1 while using logs is x
-1. 
 
This functional form is essentially equivalent to the utility function widely used by Atkinson 
where U=Y
(1-α)/1-α, and 1< α <2.  The late Brookings Institution’s scholar, Arthur Okun (1975), in 
this study on inequality provided a number of specific redistributions that he considered acceptable. 
These redistributions turn out to be consistent with a utility function that is a 3/4
th root function of 
income (U=I
.75).
15 Fair (1971) using a similar mathematical form concluded that the exponent on 
 
14 Note that Plato (1960, p.127) argued that no one in a society should be more than four 
times richer than the poorest member. 
15 Okun (1975) provides several combinations of tax-transfers that would be acceptable to 
him; from these this author has derived a utility function that would be consistent with these 
transfers being desirable. Great liberties have been taken in invoking Okun’s name, however, since 
he was critical of interpersonal utility comparisons in the abstract. In addition, it is possible that built 
into these transfers are his perceived concerns about incentives, thus he might have advocated a 
more egalitarian split of a fixed pie.       
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income was approximately .3.
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However, the use of a simple log or exponent function has several significant shortcomings. 
Firstly, utility is not invariant to nominal changes in income; in addition, cross-country comparisons 
where the standard of living varied significantly might also be questionable with this function. Thus, 
it would seem that the level of income level should be standardized by some factor to eliminate this 
nominal effect. Here it is proposed that income should be standardized by redefining it as the level 
of nominal income (N) divided by the level of subsistence income (S); thus I=N/S. When using the 
log form for the utility function, i.e., U= ln(N/S), the subsistence level of income has a value of zero. 
If a subsistence level is given a value of zero, however, relative comparisons to this base line level 
(such as this individual is 3 times better off than this individual) become somewhat meaningless or 
undefined since it involves division by zero. In addition, it might be reasonably argued that even at 
the minimum level of subsistence, the utility level is some positive number and some addition 
disutility must be included such as work or pain in order to get the individual to a level of utility of 
zero where he may be indifferent towards living. In addition, most individuals consider life at 
subsistence preferable to death, and most societies are not indifferent between a person at 
subsistence and a dead person. Thus it would appear to be reasonable to assume that the utility level 
of minimum subsistence corresponds to some positive level of utility. A desirable utility function 
would have the form of U= ln(N/S) + ln C, where C is a constant equal to how many times the 
subsistence level of income is required in order for utility to double. This functional form is 
therefore able to incorporate Bentham’s “doubling” proposition (i.e., C=10,000). A third factor 
could be added to include disutility from pain, etc., but that is not relevant to the issues addressed in 
                                                 
16 Fair (1971) assumes a Cobb-Douglas utility function with income and leisure. The 
exponent on income is then derived to be the percentage of the total possible working time an 
individual works.  
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this paper.  
 
An alternative approach to using one’s introspection about marginal utilities at different 
levels of income to determining the degree of curvature in the utility function, is to use the expected 
value of utility hypothesis to evaluate the desirability of different levels of income. For example, 
consider the following choice. An individual has the option of either making $100,000, which is the 
average for an economics professor at a doctoral institution; or being given a 50 percent chance of 
consuming at the level of about $10,000 which is the assumed level of a subsistence existence (or 
graduate student), or a 50 percent probability of consuming $1,000,000.  Almost all of my 
acquaintances in an unscientific sample picked the $100,000 without hesitation. Thus we should 
expect that the functional form chosen will at least be consistent with this choice. In order to pick the 
$100,000 alternative, the exponent utility function needs a β of less than .1 while the log function 
requires that C be greater than 100.  
 
It has also been argued by Hardin (1982) that in order to address the problems raised by 
Bernoulli’s Saint Petersburg Paradox it is necessary to assume that at some level of income total 
utility reaches some maximum. In addition, there have been attempts, such as Mosteller and Nogee 
(1951), to determine the shape of the utility curve by using empirical experiments. These researchers 
used fairly complex games of chance using very small dollar amounts to estimate the shape of utility 
curves. Unfortunately from these experiments the authors concluded that it did not appear that the 
subjects had similar or constant utility curves nor did they appear to maximize their expected utility. 
A number of explanations for these behaviors have been postulated, but further analysis along this 
line is not considered here; these issues are mentioned simply to point out that many questions 
remain about this line of thought.   
 
Note also that we have continued to assume that each person’s utility is dependent only on 
their own income; each person’s utility level is not a function of the incomes or welfares of others. 
However, there is evidence that utility levels are interdependent. In fact there is much research 
which suggests that relative income, and not absolute income is the most important factor (Easterlin, 
2001). Thurow (1971) suggests that the distribution of income may be an argument in each person’s 
utility function. Generally when relative income is introduced into the utility function, social welfare 
maximization requires more equality than when relative income is left out (Boskin and Sheshinski, 
1978).  Envy is also clearly a human trait, but this also is entirely ignored in applying the Pareto 
criterion.  Although these issues of interdependence will not be addressed in this paper, it further 
demonstrates how flimsy the current foundation of welfare economics is. It is only by ignoring this 
relative effect that the Pareto criteria for social welfare concerning utilities can be applied to income. 
Alesina, Tella, and MacCulloch (2001) find that the level of inequality in a society is a significant 
factor in explaining the level of happiness in Europe, but not America. Thus this would suggest that 
our proposed welfare function possibly undervalues economic equality by not adjusting the 
individual utilities appropriately. Since quantification of this interdependence involves another great 
leap into the normative abyss, it will not be undertaken. But it must be recognized that any gain in 
our social welfare function that includes greater inequality is probably less than its actual gain.       
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Quantifying the Social Welfare Function  
 
Modern welfare economics has not been especially concerned with the ideal functional form 
for the social welfare function. This has been due to the fact that the derivation of the Pareto 
conditions only requires that the SWF be ordinal; thus whether the SWF is multiplicative or additive 
is not significant since one can be transformed into another by a monotonic transformation of the 
individual utility indices. However, in order to specify the level of social welfare it is necessary to 
have a specific cardinal function. For the analysis here, the social welfare will be defined using a 
generalized social welfare function first proposed by Alexander (1974). Social welfare is defined 
with the general function W = ( Σ(UN
 α ))
(1/α) where α is unconstrained; in the two-person case (A and 
B) this is expressed as W= (UA
 α + UB  ) . When α=1, the function essentially becomes the 
utilitarian social welfare function where W= U
B
                                                
α (1/α)
A + UB for the two person case.  If the utilities of the 
two individuals are put on the axes, then a utilitarian social welfare curve is a straight line with a 
slope of minus one. There is nothing desirable about a more equal distribution of utilities. Many of 
those who have objected to utilitarianism have objected to it as not being egalitarian enough. When 
α<1, the social welfare function becomes convex in utility space implying a preference for equality 
of welfare.   The practical importance of this disagreement may possibly be reduced once 
inequality is discussed using income as opposed to utilities. Since the utilitarians in practice also 
believe in the law of diminishing marginal utility of income, in terms of income space, the points of 
equal social welfare are a convex curve. It is possible for a utilitarian with a significantly concave 
utility function to have a more convex social welfare function in income space than an egalitarian 
with a more linear utility function. It is interesting that so much of the philosophical opposition to 
utilitarianism has come from those advocating a more egalitarian perspective, since as a practical 
political matter, it is clear that the majority opinion of the general public is even less egalitarian than 
utilitarianism.  Little (2002, p54) likewise has concluded that “utilitarianism is too egalitarian for 
almost everyone’s taste.” Given this observation, as well as the long historical support for 
utilitarianism, in this paper the social welfare function is formulated using Alexander’s formulation 
but with special emphasis on the utilitarian specification.  
17
 
In picking the most desirable form for the utility function, it is necessary to consider not only 
 
17 There are other more egalitarian functional forms such as that used by Nash (1950) and 
Fair (1971) who suggested W = ΠUN. Kaneko and Nakamura (1979) provide a theoretical 
justification for that formulation. Fair stated that this function “seems to be consistent with 
commonly held ethical views.” Ng (1981) found this function to be the most popular one in a 
random survey of economists in British universities.  However, the function gives inordinate weight 
to small gains to those most worse off. This seems inconsistent with individual behavior under 
uncertainty and inconsistent with economic policy as actually practiced. This inadequacy is 
especially important when death is a probable outcome; this function assumes that society would be 
willing to reduce the utilities of all members of a society by a tremendous amount in order to keep 
one person from dying. However, poor members of society die all the time from the lack of medical 
care, freezing on the street, or having to drive an unsafe car. Realistically, society obviously does not 
put that much weight on one individual. In this case the function even violates the Pareto principle.   
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its realism towards how utility is related to income for an individual but also how usefully that 
functional form can be incorporated into a social welfare function. If we adopt Alexander’s 
specification for the social welfare function,  a utility function with utility as an exponential function 
of income
18 has certain desirable mathematical properties which can be best demonstrated by 
assuming two individuals (A and B). With the Alexander social welfare function and assuming utility 















Along a given social welfare curve where d (W
 α)=0,  
d (W
 α)=( ∂(IA
β α) / ∂IA ) d IA +  ( ∂(IB
β α) / ∂IB ) d I B B
B = 0 
( ∂(IA
β α) / ∂IA ) /( ∂(IB
β α) / ∂IB ) = - (d I B B
B)/(d IA) 




                                                
)/(d IA) 
 
Thus in income space, the social welfare function is homothetic in that the optimal 
distribution of a given amount of income is independent of the level of income. Also, as can be seen 
β and α affect the income trade-off essentially in the same manner. Thus this functional form for the 
social welfare function is desirable since its coefficients can be interpreted in a number of different 
ways that would be consistent with a wide number of ethical standards. For example, with a 
exponent of one half, the function can be interpreted to be a situation with a utilitarian social welfare 
function with a utility function which is the square root of income, or alternatively could be 
interpreted as a social welfare function with a preference for equality of utilities (α = .5) but where 
utility is proportional to income (β = 1).  Therefore if income were to increase by a certain 
percentage, the amount of inequality that could be tolerated in order to maintain the same level of 
social welfare is the same for any function with the same value of αβ.  Also note that a utilitarian 
(α=1) who believed in rapidly diminishing utility of income (i.e., β=.25) would have a more convex 
social welfare function in income space than an egalitarian with α=.75 who believed in a less steep 
diminishing marginal utility of income of β=.5.  Also note that although the shape of a social welfare 
curve (for a given distribution of income) is dependent only on the product αβ, the spacing of the 
indifferent curves is a function only of β (along a ray, an increase of income by x increases social 
welfare x
1/β). Thus the substantive differences between utilitarianism and the more egalitarian 
philosophies in terms of the preference for an egalitarian distribution of income is much less than is 
generally assumed once it is accepted that a concave utility function is and always has been a 
fundamental and integral part of utilitarian philosophy.
19  There may, of course, be situations in 
 
18For this section, the income variable can be defined as either N/S or N; the results are the 
same. 
19The discussion of Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) is typical of much of this literature; 
they define social welfare as a function of “the incomes or utilities” and apparently which doesn’t 
seem to affect their function. Similarly, Kelsey (1994) discusses utilitarians with linear utility 
functions; utilitarians from the very beginning have never assumed a linear utility function. These 
authors assessments that “the utilitarian rule has no distributional content” is true for the utility  
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which these differences become substantive, such as when discussing utilities that are not related to 
income or the quantity of consumption. 
 
If utility is defined as a log function of income, UN=ln(IN) +lnC, then in the two person case, 
the slope of the Alexander social welfare function is:  
 




α-1/IB)   B
 
which in the utilitarian case (i.e., α=1) condenses to IB/I B A. Since the slope of a social welfare curve is 
the ratio of the two individuals’ marginal utility of income, then any point on this social welfare 
curve has the property that MUA/MUB
B=IB/I B
                                                                                                                                                            
A. Note that this results in a function similar to the 
exponent case where β=0, and has the very intuitive feature that if individual A is x times richer than 
individual B, then individual B has x times the marginal utility of individual A; likewise, if we take x 
dollars from A we need give only one dollar to B in order to keep social welfare constant.  
 
Thus we have a class of social welfare functions with the desirable property that for a given 
ratio of income between the two individuals, their ratios of marginal utility are fixed. The convexity 
of the social welfare function is a function of α β. In the utilitarian case (α=1), when β=0 (defined as 
U=ln I+ln C) the social welfare curve is quite convex, and becomes flatter as β increases (defined as 
U=I
β when β>0) until it becomes a straight line with no preference for income equality when β=1. 
When α<1, the social welfare curve is more convex (than when α=1) and becomes less convex as β 
increases but never becomes linear.  
  
Finally it should be pointed out that the implication of this social welfare function, where 
increases in national income that are unequally distributed might actually lower welfare, is 
consistent not only with the introspective assumptions about utility but is also consistent with a wide 
range of objective social welfare measures. Figure 1 shows how the Fordham Institute’s Index of 
Social Health for the United States, using indicators such as child poverty, health care coverage, and 
youth homicide, declined over the last several decades despite the increases in GDP; this divergence 
began with the increases in inequality which started in the 1970s.         
 
 
Trade and Income Distribution 
 
The fact that trade could increase national income but could also redistribute income has 
been recognized since Ricardo. It was understood that the Corn Laws (tariffs on the import of corn 
into England) benefited the owners of land and lowered the real wages of the urban workers. Debate 
about the effects of the Corn Laws was central in the debates about welfare economics in the 19
th 
century. The distributional consequences of trade for the factors of production in the neoclassical 
 
distribution but not the income distribution. Ng (1975) has suggested that many of those preferring a 
convex SWF in utility space suffer from “utility illusion” resulting from double discounting for 
income’s effect on utility.    
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trade model were generally understood by Heckscher (1919) who believed that a factor could lose 
from trade. This was more rigorously developed by Lerner in 1933 (Chacholiades, 1978), although 
many prominent economists of the time (i.e., Haberler) contended that trade could not lower 
absolute wages. The definitive treatment was provided by Stolper-Samuelson (1941) who showed 
formally that trade liberalization would lower not only the relative return to the scarce factor but its 
absolute return as well. An important assumption of the modern welfare theory of international trade 
is that a dollar of income produces the same amount of social welfare regardless of who spends it. 
However, once it is recognized that the income levels of the winners and losers differ, and that the 
marginal utility of that dollar is different for the losers and winners, the question arises as to whether 
the social welfare changes produced by the income redistributions inherent in trade are able to 
dominate the social welfare improvement from a larger national income. This outcome is most likely 
if the redistributions of income are large relative to the efficiency gains and if the income of the 
winners is appreciably larger than the losers.   
 
The average advocate for trade greatly underestimates the amount of redistribution involved 
with trade policy changes. In their view trade produces large efficiency gains with only a second 
order distributional shift. The evidence, however, suggests that trade taxes are similar to most other 
taxes; the redistributions are large, and the efficiency effects are of only second order importance. 
Rodrik (1992) has created an index referred to as the political cost-benefit ratio (PCBR) calculated 
as the amount of redistribution required in order to obtain one dollar of net income gain. Rodrik’s 
formula for the PCBR= -1/(μεt), where μ=the share of imports in domestic consumption, ε=import 
demand elasticity, and t=tariff level. The PCBR index increases with increases in μ, ε, and t. Rodrik 
concludes (p.12) “ in most reasonable circumstances the PCBR lies above 5."   In other words, the 
losers will lose $5 in order for the winners to get $6. However when the share of imports is low (i.e., 
10 percent) and when the tariff is low (i.e., 10 percent) the PCBR approaches 25. The large amount 
of redistribution relative to efficiency gain is most obvious in the simple partial equilibrium diagram 
of a tariff in Figure 2.  If SW represents the world price, then the domestic price with a tariff is SW + t. 
If the tariff is eliminated, the efficiency gain is represented by the area of the two small triangles 
EDH + BGC, while the redistribution of income is represented by the area of  JEHK + EBCD; as 
can be seen, the amount of income redistributed is much greater than the net efficiency gain. 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1992, p. 682) are one of the few to recognize the relative size importance 
of redistribution; they state, “When a tariff is imposed, part of the impact is upon economic 
efficiency but the largest effect is often redistributive.”    
 
For the analysis here, the ratio of factor income redistribution (R) to efficiency gain (E) will 
be defined slightly differently than by Rodrik and made more applicable for analyzing trade 
liberalization in general equilibrium. The tariff revenue is assumed to be redistributed to the factors 
in general proportion to their overall income shares; thus changes in tariff revenue do not produce 
measurable redistributions of income. If the tariff revenue changes are included as part of the 
redistributions, then the calculated amount of redistributions would be about 50 percent higher.  
Since prices change, the usual questions arise as to how to calculate real income changes; in this 
analysis the redistribution and efficiency gains are calculated as equivalent variations in income. 
Since the definition of what constitutes a redistribution differs slightly from how Rodrik calculates 
it, the terminology used here will refer to the ratio of redistributions to efficiency as the R/E ratio instead of using Rodrik’s PCBR. Note that both the redistributions and the efficiency gains are 
calculated within the standard framework of real trade theory, where any transitional costs are 
ignored and where none of the factor endowments are lost. Including the transitional costs of 
unemployment and relocation costs, and the possible loss of sector specific physical and human 
capital would reduce the efficiency gains and increase the redistributional effects. Since these 
transitional costs are not included, the government’s provision of trade adjustment assistance is also 
not considered relevant since it is concerned primarily with reducing these adjustment costs. 
 
In the standard general equilibrium H-O trade model; the ratio of redistribution to efficiency 
depends on a number of parameters in the model such as the similarities of the factor endowments 
and factor intensities, the marginal rate of substitution in consumption, the level of tariffs, and the 
terms of trade. In a standard 2-factor 2-good H-O model with fixed terms of trade and with Cobb 
Douglas consumption and production functions, the ratio of factor income redistribution (R) to 
efficiency gain (E) has a general magnitude usually between one and three. Thus when the R/E=3, 
the losing factor loses three dollars for every four dollars gained by the gaining factor. 
 
For the small country case, where the terms of trade are fixed and external to the model, the 
redistribution-efficiency ratio increases as the tariff rate (t) falls, increases as the terms of trade 
decline (tot), and increases as the factor intensity of the two goods increases( kx=Kx/Lx). Changes in 
demand created by changing the exponents in the consumption function either increase both factors’ 
incomes or decrease both depending on initial demand conditions. Thus  
           -   -    + 
R/E = f(t, tot ,kx/ky) 
 
It is often suggested that the factor relocations implicit in the standard H-O model will only 
occur over many years, perhaps even a decade, and that a model with capital fixed in its sectors is a 
more realistic approach to modeling trade policy outcomes. The reallocation to efficiency ratio is 
also calculated for the specific factor model where capital is specific to its industry using similar 
coefficients (and fixed TOT) as in the H-O simulations. Using the Cobb-Douglas functional forms 
and capital specificity, results in a reallocation of labor by sector, as well as efficiency gains that are 
only about 6 percent of those that result in the standard  H-O case. A tariff reduction increases the 
return to capital in the expanding industry and decreases its return in the contracting industry; the 
wage rate can either increase or decrease (depending on demand conditions), and therefore need not 
move in the direction specified in the long run by Stolper-Samuelson (Mayer, 1974; and Mussa, 
1974). In this model, therefore, there are redistributions not just between capital and labor, but 
between capital in the different sectors. If the owners of capital are assumed to hold a diversified 
portfolio, then only the redistributions between capital and labor may be important; in this case the 
R/E ratio has a similar magnitude, as in the H-O case. If the redistributions between the owners of 
capital are considered, the R/E ratio increases to over 5. Thus the losers lose $5 for every $6 gained 
by the winners. Although the R/E ratio may be higher in the specific factors case, the implications of 
this for social welfare, as will be discussed in a later section, turn out not to be significant for 
welfare calculations, since the income level of many of the winners and losers may be the same, 
since they are capital owners.  
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As is well known, the gains from trade liberalization can be reduced significantly or even 
turned into losses once possible terms of trade changes are allowed.  Using a simple miniature CGE 
(with a H-O core, and reasonable parameters for technical efficiency differences, trade tariffs, and 
endowment differences, etc.) developed by Shelburne (2004) to describe North-South trade, this R/E 
index for the North is found to be 1.7 for a foreign (i.e., South) liberalization, 3.4 for a mutual 
liberalization, and 7.7 for a domestic (i.e., North) liberalization. 
  
An examination of other CGEs developed by other economists provides similar estimates. 
For example, it is possible to calculate the R/E implicit in a model developed by Lawrence and 
Evans (1996). This model was developed to examine the trade and wages issue; Lawrence is well 
known as an author who has argued that wage effects from trade are minimal. Yet the R/E ratio in 
their “base case” model is 4.93; that being, $4.93 must be taken from unskilled workers (high school 
or less) for every $5.93 that goes to skilled workers (at least some college education). This study 
also presented various results using different assumptions about the elasticity parameters using 
constant elasticity of substitution production and consumption functions; from these it is possible to 
determine how these alter the implications for distribution and efficiency. Generally, as the elasticity 
of substitution between the factors in production is reduced (e.g., less elastic) and as the elasticity of 
substitution between the goods in consumption is increased, the greater the overall net efficiency 
gains from trade. Even in the case where the efficiency gains are the largest relative to the 
distributional change (production elasticity of .5 and consumption elasticity of .99), the R/E is still 
2.66.  Generally, parameter changes that increase the efficiency gains from trade also increase the 
allocative distributional changes, so that the implicit R/E is relatively invariant to the assumed 
parameters.  
 
Krugman (1995) presents a stylized tiny CGE to assess the possible role of increased North-
South trade on increasing the wage premium for skilled labor. This model, like much of the literature 
on the trade wages debate, assumes two factors -- skilled labor and unskilled labor. Although he 
does not present the necessary data to calculate R/E ratios in that article, this author has recreated his 
model (see Appendix A) and obtained the necessary data. The exogenous change in domestic prices 
assumed by Krugman that would be necessary to produce the observed level of North-South trade 
results in a R/E ratio of over 61. Thus the amount of income redistributed from unskilled labor to 
skilled labor by increased trade far exceeds (by a factor of 60) the increase in income from efficiency 
gains.   
 
These results are derived from simple trade models using the standard assumptions. More 
complex CGE models may incorporate additional factors. The results of a study undertaken by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission (2003) on the economic effects of the U.S. safeguard tariffs on 
steel (imposed in 2002) provide sufficient information to compare the efficiency gains against the 
redistributions. This study used the ITC’s workhorse CGE; unfortunately the values of the R/E ratio 
as previously defined cannot be derived from the published results because the tariff revenue is not 
allocated back to the basic factors of production. In addition, all labor is lumped together so that the 
likely gains accruing to the steel workers are not differentiated from the loses to the workers in the 
steel using industries. Nevertheless, the model finds that the tariffs resulted in $650 million of 
additional tariff revenue, the capital owners of the iron and steel industry getting an additional  $240  
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million, capital owners in auxiliary industries to the steel industry such as iron ore mining, coal 
mining, custom roll forming, energy and services gain $67 million, while labor income falls by $386 
million and capital owners of steel-consuming industries lose $601 million. The “central case” 
overall welfare gain is $41.6 million. Therefore, the elimination of the safeguard tariffs would 
redistribute almost $1 billion while the efficiency gains would be $41.6 million; the implied 
redistribution to efficiency ratio (but not technically the R/E ratio as defined) is around 23.    
 
The standard trade model does not incorporate possible economies of scale, increased 
employment, or induced endogenous economic growth; inclusion of these factors would increase the 
efficiency gains relative to the distributional shifts.  Although including these factors has become a 
popular device for trade liberalization advocates, the empirical literature supporting these factors is 
weak  (a skeptical look at these factors is provided by Deraniyagala and Fine-2001). What is clear, 
however, is how dependent the actual benefits of trade liberalization are on these secondary factors. 
An additional factor in more complex models is sectoral wage differentials; generally it has been 
found that observed wage rents for workers in the import-competing sectors are lower. 
Liberalization then moves workers from low wage industries to high wage industries; this effect can 
easily outweigh any Stolper-Samuelson effect stemming from the reduction in demand for labor as 
production shifts to more capital-intensive sectors.  However econometric evidence also suggests 
that increased imports further reduce the size of the rents in the import sector but increased exports 
do not appear to increase rents in the export sectors. Thus trade lowers the average (unweighted) 
labor rent; what happens to the average weighted labor rent has not been formally addressed. 
Another complexity that may be significant in calculating welfare effects concerns the assumption of 
homothetic utility functions. For example, there is some evidence that the poor spend a higher 
percentage of their budgets on import-competing goods such as apparel, and therefore the poorer 
workers gain more from the price reductions than consumers generally; it is possible that these price 
effects could potentially offset the real wage declines (Hanson and Reinert, 1997).  Rodrik (1992) 
has argued that the efficiency gains may increase relative to the redistribution changes during times 
of macroeconomic turmoil. Thus a fuller analysis of the welfare effects may have to consider many 
factors not developed here. Unfortunately, the information published about these more complex 
CGEs was insufficient for calculating the R/E ratios implicit in those models. In addition, many of 
the CGEs which have played a significant role in the trade policy debates such as those developed by 
Brown, Deardorff and Stern have chosen to combine the labor types into one labor group which has 
had the effect of washing out an important component of the distribution effects of trade 
liberalizations. Historically, CGEs developed to examine the effects of trade policy on income 
distribution by income level (size distribution) have concentrated on developing countries. Adelman 
and Robinson (1988) in examining possible Korean economic policies, found that although trade 
policy affected the functional distribution of income, it had an insignificant affect on the size 
distribution. Levy and van Wijnbergen (1995) examined how regional integration would alter the 
household distribution of income in order to determine how emigration would be impacted.   
 
Welfare Changes from Trade Liberalization 
 
In the previous section it was demonstrated that the income redistributions from trade 
generally exceed the efficiency gains. This conclusion, by itself, does not allow an evaluation of how  
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a trade liberalization affects welfare. An additional piece of information that is required is how the 
income levels of the winners compare to the income levels of the losers
20. It should be clear that if 
the income levels of the winners are greater than the losers, and the redistributions are large relative 
to the efficiency gains, that a trade liberalization could lower welfare if evaluated using a utilitarian 
social welfare function. In the purely theoretical model there is no presumption as to what the 
income levels are of the owners of the different factors, nor is the level of subsistence specified; 
therefore a determination of whether trade is welfare increasing or decreasing is difficult to make for 
the purely abstract model. If the utility function is assumed to be of the generalized form previously 
developed, U=I
β when β<1 and U=ln(I) +ln(C) when β=0, then for a trade liberalization to increase 




where x is the ratio of the income of the winners (IW) to the income of the losers. Therefore any 
change in social welfare will be negatively related to the R/E ratio, x, and IW and positively related to 
β. 
 
               -    -  +   - 
ΔUS = f (R/E,  x, β, IW) 
 
In order to draw more specific welfare conclusions, it is necessary to specify how the income 
of the gainers compares to the losers. Before proceeding with a more detailed examination of the 
empirical data, the assumptions made by the modelers previously discussed are examined. The 
general assumption that has been made in the literature is that the gainers have approximately twice 
the income of the losers. This is the basic assumption in Krugman (1995); in Lawrence and Evans 
(1996) this value is assumed to be 1.87, and is empirically derived to be 2.08 by Wood (1991).
21 
These assumptions are generally derived from the wage differential between nonproduction and 
production workers, which was 57 percent in 1989, or the ratio of wages based upon education 
attainment. In 1995, the real hourly wage of those with only a college degree (i.e., no advanced 
degree) made 66 percent more than those with without a college degree (Mishel et. al, 1996). 
Applying the values of the R/E and x in their respective models suggest that in order for trade to 
increase social welfare,  β must be greater than .98 in the Krugman model and greater than .70 in the 
Lawrence and Evans model. Thus in these models, in order to conclude that increased trade 
improved social welfare, it must be assumed that the marginal utility of income does not decline 
significantly as income increases.      
 
The significant increase in inequality that has occurred in the United States over the last 25 
years has been well documented. Almost every study undertaken to explain the factors causing the  
 
20 If the change in the overall distribution of income was known, it might be more useful to 
do the analysis in terms of how the distribution changed or some summary measure of it such as a 
Dalton-Atkinson measure. 
21 Wood (1991) estimated using 1985 data that skilled workers in the North made $14.99 an 
hour and unskilled workers made $7.21 (see his Table 2).  
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increasing income inequality in the United States have concluded that trade played a role. Many of 
these researchers like to point out that trade played only a minor role, but a small percentage of a 
negative number is still a negative number. Although much of the empirical literature on the trade 
and wages debate has focused exclusively on the  role of trade in increasing the relative wage of the 
skilled, it is also probable that increased North-South trade has increased the return to capital as 
well. At the simplest level, there are three basic factors – capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor. 
Unfortunately, most of the analysis has been done at the even simpler level of assuming only two 
factors, either capital and labor, or skilled labor and unskilled labor. Therefore the empirical studies 
do not provide much information about how increased trade impacted the income of these three 
factors. 
 
Examining the changes in family income distribution by quintiles reveals that from 1970 to 
1992, the bottom 60 percent of families lost 3.85 percent of total national GNI to the top 40 
percent.
22 The average income of those in the top 40 percent were 3.69 times greater than the 
average income of those in the bottom 60 percent. Using the distribution of individual pre-tax 
income by quintiles, reveals that from 1979 to 1997, the bottom 80 percent of individuals lost 7.2 per 
cent of national income to the top 20 percent.
23  Between 1979 and 1998, the bottom 95 percent lost 
10.6 percent of total income to the top 5 percent (Piketty and Saez, 2001). Those gaining significant 
income over the 1979-98 period were those in the top ten percent.  This group derives a significant 
percentage of its income from capital; the top ten percent own 80 percent of net financial assets 
which includes business assets, stocks, and bonds (Wolff, 2000). Although the capital share of 
national income remained relatively constant,  the capital share, even excluding capital gains, of U.S. 
personal income increased from about 14.5 percent in 1979 to 19.5 percent in 1998 (Piketty and 
Saez, fig. 10) and the after-tax profit rate has increased from 5.1 percent in 1979 to 7.0 percent in 
1995. Given that for North-South trade, the capital-labor ratio of exporting industries in the North is 
on average about 50 higher than that of import-competing industries (Wood, 1994), it is likely that a 
portion of this increased inequality due to increased capital income is the result of this trade. Those 
in the top ten percent who essentially own the capital stock make 7.4 times the average income of 
those in the bottom 90 percent, and over 10 times the income of those in the bottom 40 percent. Thus 
considering that increased trade has redistributed income from unskilled labor to skilled labor and 
capital, the likely value of x is probably in the range of three to five. Combining this figure with the 
results of the simulations previously discussed, would suggest it is only possible to conclude that 
increased North-South trade improved welfare if the utility function is reasonably close to being 
linear; this would appear to be an unreasonable assumption.  
 
This conclusion aside, the real objective of this paper is not to provide a definitive conclusion 
 
22 These estimates exclude households of unrelated individuals; data are from Cline (1997), 
Table 1.1. The bottom 60 percent of families went from 35.2 percent of national income in 1970 to 
31.4 percent in 1992. 
23 Individual incomes are based upon comprehensive household income adjusted by the 
square root of household size. Data from CBO (2001), Appendix table G-1c, pp.76-77.  
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about the welfare effects of North-South trade but is instead to suggest a new framework for 
evaluating the welfare effects of policy changes. Buy adopting the Alexander social welfare 
function, one can then specify the conditions (i.e., the curvature of the utility function or social 
welfare function) under which a policy change would increase welfare, and then each person is able 
to judge for himself whether or not the policy actually increased welfare based upon his perceptions 
about the shape of these curves. Thus it is being suggested that instead of concluding that a policy 
increased potential welfare by say 2 percent, it is preferable to conclude that welfare would increase 
when αβ is greater than some value, say .9. Thus instead of the researcher concluding that welfare 
has increased based upon a questionable criteria, each person can evaluate for himself the welfare 
consequences by using what they consider to be the appropriate values of α and β.   
 
Although, it has been argued here that follow-up redistributions do not actually take place in 
practice, the large ratio of redistribution to efficiency changes limit the ability to redistribute the 
gains even if society wanted to. The transfer losses can be represented in two ways, either by the 
amount of income (T) that must be taken from the individual being taxed in order for the recipient to 
get one dollar of income, or by leaky bucket losses where L is the amount of income that the 
recipient receives for every dollar obtained from the taxed individual. Obviously T is equal to 1/L.  
Ballard (1988) concluded that generally $1.50 to $2.30 had to be taken from the higher-income 
groups in order to increase the income of the lower-income groups by $1 (i.e., a T of about 2).  
Burtless (1986) found 50 percent was lost (T=2) with negative income tax welfare transfers.  
Ballard, Shoven and Whalley (1985) concluded that the net efficiency loss of collecting government 
revenue were between 17 to 56 cents on a dollar; however, these estimates do not include the 
possible welfare losses from the possible disincentives of providing income to the recipients. In 
addition, they find that the efficiency costs are greatest when taxes are placed upon more elastic 
activities and that savings are much more elastic than labor; thus taxes on capital have the largest 
efficiency losses. The increasing international mobility of capital is likely to raise these estimates 
still higher. Stuart (1984) provides estimates of a similar magnitude. Therefore taxation of capital, 
since it is the winner from trade, imposes especially steep efficiency loses. Browning and Johnson 
(1984) estimated that upper-income households lose $9.51 for each dollar increase in disposable 
income for the lower-income quintiles. Okun (1975) concluded that about 20 percent of a transfer is 
lost (T=1.25) for most redistribution schemes. These articles do not investigate the degree to which 
it matters whether the taxes are on capital directly, or in the form of income taxes on the very rich 
whose income derives from ownership of  the capital stock. A number of these estimates of transfer 
losses are derived from assumptions about labor supply elasticities, while the estimates of the R/E 
ratio presented earlier generally assume a fixed labor supply. Thus these comparisons of  R/E ratios 
and transfer losses presented here may not be entirely consistent; obviously it will be necessary to 
derive them both from the same underlying model.  
 
If 33 percent of income is lost in the redistribution process through incentive effects and 
administrative costs, then with an R/E ratio of three there is nothing to be gained by trade 
liberalization with a full compensation redistribution. Therefore, it is not at all clear whether free 
trade with compensating redistribution can produce a Pareto superior outcome relative to 
protectionism. The commonly held belief that this is possible stems from the intellectually dishonest 
step of assuming that the redistribution can be accomplished costlessly.       
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It should also be pointed that trade need not always benefit the richer individuals. The H-O 
model would suggest that in the South that trade would improve the income of the poor, which is 
unskilled labor, and lower the return to the rich, made up of the capital owners and skilled labor.  In 
this case the distributional changes add to the efficiency gains. If as before, x is defined as the 
income of the gainers (IW) divided by the income of the losers, then the change in social welfare is 
related to the variables as follows: 
             +  +   -  -   - 
ΔUS = f (R, E, x, β, IW) 
The reality of the current situation is sometimes different, however. Although trade liberalization in 
Asia during the 1960s and 1970s seemed to have lowered inequality by increasing the demand for 
unskilled labor, liberalization in many countries, especially in Latin America including Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay, during the 1980s and 1990s appears to have 
increased inequality. This is due to a number of factors, but in many Southern nations their primary 
comparative advantage is in natural resource products which are owned by the rich and require a lot 
of capital and skilled labor for their extraction. In addition, Wood (1997) has argued that with 
China’s entry into the global market, most developing countries no longer have a comparative 
advantage in unskilled-labor-intensive products. For example, Stiglitz (2002, p.86) in summarizing 
the experience of Mexico states: 
 
the benefits have accrued largely to the upper 30 percent, and have been even more 
concentrated in the top 10 percent. Those at the bottom have gained little; many are even 
worse off. 
 
Finally a cosmopolitan utilitarianist would probably suggest that trade policy should be 
evaluated based upon how policy changes alter world welfare. This framework is quite adaptable to 
that objective, especially since the utility functions as developed here have been standardized and 




When economists came to a fork in the road in the 1920s they had to determine whether to 
continue along the Cambridge utilitarian welfare tradition or to follow a new path of “value-free” 
welfare analysis. Although students of today are taught the Pareto-Robbins critique as if it is the 
undisputed truth and definitively self evident, there was much debate about this in the 1920s and 
many of the prominent welfare economists of the time were not particularity convinced. However, 
now that we have proceeded down the road of modern welfare analysis, it is obvious that the path 
has proven to be much more disappointing than originally expected. Although the Pareto criteria at 
its purest level remains unobjectionable, when combined with a number of complementary 
assumptions, such as the compensation principle, the disregard for the theory of second best, and 
independent utility functions based solely on income, modern welfare economics results in 
questionable conclusions which are not particularly value free. These complementary assumptions 
were adopted not because of their realism but because they allowed the market fundamentalists to 
derive their desired political conclusions. The compensation principle without actual compensation  
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lacks any moral legitimacy. As a practical matter, compensation (to the losers) is not made, and in 
fact there may actually be a vicious redistribution cycle, where increased inequality resulting from 
economic processes results in even more inequality derived from the political process.  It is time to 
retrace our steps to the earlier principles and attempt to build a welfare theory on reasonable and 
ethical principles. In returning to the old testament of welfare economics, the concepts of cardinal 
utility, the law of diminishing marginal utility of income, and interpersonal utility comparisons are 
resurrected. These are not normative concepts but are positive value judgments about the true nature 
of reality. It is not clear why certain other highly questionable assumptions have been accepted as 
legitimate by the economics profession while these have been scorned. 
 
Although there are a large number of ethical theories, a social welfare function (previously 
proposed by Alexander) is adopted which allows for a wide range of ethical beliefs. When utility is 
assumed to be subject to diminishing marginal utility of income, one basic coefficient (αβ) is able to 
capture the shape of the social welfare function. Utilitarianism is suggested as the base case since it 
is a somewhat “middle of the road” ethical standard and one of significant historical importance 
from which most alternative ethical theories are compared.  
   
The redistributions inherent in trade liberalization are large relative to the efficiency gains. In 
addition the winners in the developed countries, as well as many developing countries, have incomes 
several times the income of the losers. Skilled labor, the primary winner, has several times the 
income of unskilled labor, the primary loser; the owners of capital (another winner) have incomes 5 
to 10 times greater than unskilled labor.  With a decreasing marginal utility of income, a trade 
induced distributional change harming the poor can override an efficiency gain which increases 
national income, so that net social welfare falls.  Using reasonable ethical assumptions, it is easy to 
reach a conclusion that liberalized North-South trade, without accompanying redistribution, does not 
increase social welfare in the North. 
 
With the social welfare function and utility functions presented, it is possible to derive the 
conditions under which a policy change would increase welfare. Thus it is proposed that instead of 
researchers concluding what the welfare effects are based upon the highly questionable 
compensation principle, they should state their results in terms of what underlying parameters 
(concerning the social welfare and utility functions) would be consistent with a welfare 
improvement. With the functions proposed here, this condition can be summarized with one 
coefficient which describes the convexity of the social welfare function in income space.     
 
As an historical note on economic thought, it should be pointed out that there is some irony 
in this essay in that the utilitarian framework is being used to question the desirability of free trade 
when in fact the early utilitarians including the Philosophical Radicals used it to argue for free trade 
(Welch, 1987).
24 However, the situation has changed: the Corn Laws benefited the landed 
aristocracy and harmed the urban poor; current protectionism in the developed countries benefits the 
poor.   
 
24 Yet another irony is that Nicolas Kaldor whose name is so associated with the compensation principle once had an 
office just down the hall from this author.   








Appendix A-The Krugman (1995) Model 
 
Essentially, the Krugman model can be characterized by the following equations: where S is skilled 
worker units which is two for every actual skilled worker; U is unskilled workers; W is welfare; Q is 













And the units were chosen so that before trade with the NIE’s (South)  
∂Q1/∂S1=∂Q2/S2=∂Q1/∂U1=∂Q2/∂U2=P1=P2
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